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Abstract: This Article deals with a problem which has repeatedly arisen in 
state and federal courts, resulting in a number of splintered opinions.  In 1977, the 
Supreme Court ruled that only direct purchasers of a price-fixed product may sue 
under the Sherman Act.  Thus, under the “Illinois Brick rule,” consumers who buy 
a price-fixed product from a middle-man may not sue.  Many states responded by 
passing “Illinois Brick repealers” which aimed to allow such suits.  This Article 
addresses two questions which have divided the state and federal courts: 
Did the Illinois Brick repealers grant automatic standing to any indirect 
purchaser of a price-fixed product, or did they simply repeal the per se rule that 
                                                          
 J.D., Yale Law School, 2009; B.A., Gettysburg College, 2006.  The author would like to thank George 
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indirect purchasers can never sue, leaving the question of which indirect purchasers 
may sue to a traditional “antitrust standing” analysis? 
If the latter, to what extent must the traditional antitrust standing doctrine be 
modified to render it consistent with the policies of the Illinois Brick repealers? 
Although no academic piece has considered these questions, twenty state and 
federal courts have—all within the last ten years.  This Article summarizes the 
approaches the courts have taken to both of these questions, criticizes those that 
have gone wrong in its view, and offers a modified test that is both practical and 
faithful to the policy choices embodied in the repealers.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1975, the state of Illinois sued the Illinois Brick Company (“Illinois 
Brick”), alleging that it fixed the price of concrete blocks, in violation of the 
Sherman Act.  The state claimed that Illinois Brick thereby charged contractors 
artificially-increased prices for blocks, and that the contractors passed these costs 
on to the state in the form of higher prices for construction contracts.  In Illinois 
Brick Co. v. Illinois,1 the Supreme Court found that Illinois had not stated a claim 
under the Sherman Act, holding that so-called “indirect purchasers” of price-fixed 
products (i.e., those who did not buy directly from the price-fixer) may not sue 
under the Act.   
Several commentators have praised Illinois Brick as the most efficient means 
of combating price-fixing.2  Allowing indirect purchasers to split the recovery with 
direct purchasers, they have noted, would dilute the incentive of direct purchasers 
to act as private attorneys general.  And we should not reduce that incentive 
because direct purchasers are in the best position to detect price-fixing.3  
But Illinois Brick turned out to be politically unpopular because it does not 
offer any compensation to consumers who were harmed by illegal schemes.  
Twenty-four states responded to the decision by passing so-called “Illinois Brick 
repealers,” which were designed to allow indirect purchasers to sue under state 
antitrust laws.4   
The first question this article considers is as follows: Do the repealers simply 
remove Illinois Brick’s per se bar on indirect purchaser suits, or do they go further 
and abrogate the requirement of “antitrust standing”?  Antitrust standing is a bit of 
a misnomer, since the doctrine is more like “proximate cause” in torts than it is like 
Article III standing.5  The idea is that, since “antitrust violations may be expected 
                                                          
1 431 U.S. 720 (1977) [hereinafter Illinois Brick]. 
2 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to 
Sue Under the Antitrust Laws?  An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 
602 (1979). 
3 See id. 
4 For a discussion of the history of “Illinois Brick repealer” statutes, see Ronald W. Davis, Indirect 
Purchaser Litigation: ARC America’s Chickens Come Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick Wall, 65 
ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 382-95 (1997).  The Court has ruled that the Sherman Act does not preempt these 
Illinois Brick repealers.  See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989). 
5 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 760 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling antitrust standing “not unlike the 
concept of proximate cause in tort law”); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council 
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531-36 (1983) (analogizing antitrust standing to proximate cause) 
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to cause ripples of harm to flow through the Nation’s economy,”6 courts must 
devise some limits on who can sue under Sherman.  
In Associated General Contractors of California v. California State Council 
of Carpenters (“AGC”),7 the Supreme Court provided five factors8 which should 
guide the antitrust standing analysis: (1) Whether the plaintiff is a participant in the 
allegedly restrained  market;9 (2) the directness or indirectness of the alleged 
injury;10 (3) whether there exists an identifiable class of persons better situated to 
bring suit;11 (4) whether the plaintiff’s alleged injuries are speculative;12 and (5) 
the risk of duplicative liability and the complexity of apportioning damages.13 
The majority of courts to consider the issue have found that Illinois Brick 
repealers do not count as automatic grants of antitrust standing to anyone who 
qualifies as an “indirect purchaser.”14  Instead, these courts apply some form of the 
AGC test.  Three of the four most recent courts to consider the question, however, 
have found that the Illinois Brick repealers also repealed the requirement of 
antitrust standing.15  This article argues that the AGC test should apply to states 
with Illinois Brick repealers. 
Applying the AGC test to Illinois Brick repealers raises a second question: 
how should the test be modified (if at all) to accommodate the policy goals 
embodied in the repealers?  The courts that apply AGC have been rather 
                                                          
[hereinafter AGC]. 
6  Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77 (1982).  
7 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
8 Although the factors are stated differently at times, I present the most commonly used version. 
9 See AGC, 459 U.S. at 538-39.  While it has been argued that AGC never intended for this to be a 
factor, see C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Victims Without Antitrust Remedies: The Narrowing of Standing 
in Private Antitrust Actions, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1997), this factor has been included in the tests 
applied by most circuit courts, see id. at 1 (observing that the federal circuit courts have distilled the 
Supreme Court’s holding to the principle that antitrust standing “should be limited, either absolutely or 
presumptively, to ‘consumers or competitors’” in the restrained market).  
10 See AGC, 459 U.S. at 540. 
11 Id. at 541-42. 
12 Id. at 543. 
13 Id. at 543-44. 
14 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 196 
F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 1999); In re Intel Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d 404, 408-09 
(D. Del. 2007); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 2d 
1072, 1088-89 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Orr v. Beamon, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211 (D. Kan. 1999); Southard 
v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 734 N.W.2d 192, 197 (Iowa 2007); Knowles v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., No. Civ.A. CV-
03-707. 2004 WL 2475284, at *3-5 (Me. Super. Ct. Oct 20, 2004); Stark v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., No.03-
055030-CZ, 2004 WL 1879003, at *4 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July, 23 2004); Crouch v. Crompton Corp., Nos. 
02 CV 4375, 03 CV 2514, 2004 WL 2414027, at *10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2004); Ho v. Visa 
U.S.A. Inc, No. 112316/00, 2004 WL 1118534 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 21, 2004), aff’d, 793 N.Y.S.2d 8 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Beckler v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., No. 09-04-C-00030, 2004 WL 2115144, at *2-3 
(N.D. Dist. Ct. 2004); Strang v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., No. 03 CV 011323, 2005 WL 1403769 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 
Feb 8, 2005); Kanne v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 723 N.W.2d 293, 298-300 (Neb. 2006); Peterson v. Visa 
U.S.A. Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-8080, 2005 WL 1403761 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2005). 
15 See infra Section II.C.  Although the courts applying AGC far out-number those that do not, if 
you compare only federal courts and state supreme courts the split is just four to three.  Moreover, the 
three represent the more recent trend.  It is also worth noting that, within the last three years, four 
federal courts have sought out a middle ground by refusing to apply AGC to state antitrust claims until 
they receive a clear directive from that state’s supreme court.  See infra, Sub-section II.C.4. 
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inconsistent on this point, sometimes not even noticing the issue.16  This article 
recognizes that if the AGC test is applied strictly and without modification, it could 
effectively reinstate Illinois Brick’s per se bar of indirect purchaser suits.17  Thus, 
the test must be modified so that it screens remote and speculative claims, without 
blocking those indirect purchaser suits that state plausible theories of damages.  
This article offers a modified AGC test that is consistent with the Illinois Brick 
repealers and produces results which are predictable, efficient, and fair. 
This article will focus on four reoccurring fact patterns upon which courts 
have divided18:  
1. The Antibiotic Case (“Antibiotic”): Consumers of antibiotics bring suit 
alleging antitrust violations by antibiotics manufacturers.19  The manufacturers 
sold the drugs to wholesalers, who sold to retailers, who sold to the plaintiff-
consumers.20 
2. The Computer Chip Case (“Computer Chip”): Consumers of computers 
bring suit against manufacturers of the processing chip used in the computers they 
purchased, alleging antitrust violations.21  The defendants sold the chips to 
computer manufacturers, who used the chips to make computers, which they sold 
to the wholesalers, who sold to the retailers, who sold to the plaintiff-consumers.22 
3. The Rubber Tire Case (“Rubber Tire”): Consumers of tires bring suit 
against manufacturers of certain rubber-processing chemicals that are used to make 
tires (among other uses), alleging antitrust violations.23  The defendants sold the 
chemicals to tire manufacturers, who used them to make tires, which they sold to 
wholesalers, who sold to retailers, who sold to the plaintiff-consumers.24  Prior to 
the filing of this suit, the defendants pled guilty to criminal charges in federal court 
and received fines totaling 116 million dollars.25  Also prior to this suit, the direct 
                                                          
16 See infra, Section III.A. 
17 In so recognizing, the article concedes a point to those who argue that the AGC test should not 
be applied at all to Illinois Brick repealers.  See Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn. 
2007) (“We do not believe that the legislature repudiated Illinois Brick and invited indirect purchaser 
suits only for courts to dismiss those suits on the pleadings based on the very concerns that motivated 
Illinois Brick.”). 
18 Compare DRAM, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (denying standing in case with a Computer Chip fact 
pattern), with Intel, 496 F. Supp. 2d 404 (granting standing in a case with a Computer Chip fact 
pattern); compare Crouch, 2004 WL 2414027 (denying standing in a case with a Rubber Tire fact 
pattern), with Lorix, 736 N.W.2d 619 (granting standing in a case with a Rubber Tire fact pattern).  The 
reason why these fact patterns have been considered by so many courts is that separate indirect 
purchaser suits arising from the same events were filed throughout the country. 
Every court to consider the Visa fact pattern has denied standing.  See Crouch, 2004 WL 2414027, at 
*14–15 (discussing such cases).  However, not all have agreed that the AGC test is the proper basis for 
denying the claim.  See Lorix, 736 N.W.2d at 632 (suggesting that the lower court’s dismissal of a Visa 
claim on the grounds that it failed the AGC test was the correct result for the wrong reason). 
19 See, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 440 
F.2d 1079 (1971). 
20 See id. 
21 See, e.g., Intel, 496 F. Supp. 2d 404; DRAM, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1072. 
22 See id. 
23  See, e.g., Crouch, 2004 WL 2414027. 
24  See id. 
25  See id. 
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purchasers of the rubber-processing chemicals filed a nationwide class action, 
alleging the same facts as the instant case.26 
4. The Visa Case (“Visa”): Consumers of a wide variety of products bring 
suit against Visa and MasterCard, alleging that defendants committed antitrust 
violations that resulted in merchants being overcharged for credit card services 
throughout the state.27  This overcharge allegedly passed from the merchants to the 
consumers in the form of higher prices on a variety of items.  Prior to the filing of 
this suit, a class consisting of over four million merchants from across the country 
sued the same defendants in federal court, alleging the same antitrust violations.28  
Visa and MasterCard settled this prior suit for over three billion dollars.29 
This article will proceed as follows.  Part II argues—based on the text of the 
Illinois Brick repealers and on the context in which they were passed—that the 
repealers should not be read as abrogating AGC.  Part III begins by examining 
attempts by courts to modify the AGC test so as to render it consistent with the 
policy judgments embedded in the Illinois Brick repealers.30  Part III continues by 
constructing a modified test of its own.31  The article concludes by applying Part 
III’s modified AGC test to the four scenarios presented above. 
II. WHETHER THE AGC FACTORS APPLY TO STATE ANTITRUST LAWS 
 This Part argues that the Illinois Brick repealers should be read as permitting a 
modified application of the AGC test.  Section A argues from text; Section B from 
history.  Section C criticizes cases that have taken opposing views. 
A.  Argument from Text 
Illinois Brick repealers come in two forms.  One form notes: “This action 
may be brought by any person who is injured in his or her business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this chapter, regardless of 
whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant.”32 
The other common form is similar: “Any person . . . injured directly or 
indirectly in its business or property by any other person or corporation by reason 
of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by [the antitrust laws] may sue 
for the injury in a civil action.”33 
                                                          
26  See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See Crouch, 2004 WL 2414027. 
     30   See infra, Section III.A.  
31  See infra, Sections III.B, III.C. 
32 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 2003) (emphasis added). 
33 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1104 (2009) (emphasis added).  The District of Columbia statute 
does not fit either model.  See D.C. CODE § 28-4509(a) (2010) (“Any indirect purchaser in the chain of 
manufacture, production, or distribution of goods or services, upon proof of payment of all or any part 
of any overcharge for such goods or services, shall be deemed to be injured within the meaning of this 
chapter.”).  However, the District of Columbia courts have still found that the statute does not preclude 
application of the AGC test.  See Peterson v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-8080, 2005 WL 1403761 
(D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2005). 
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It is clear that the state legislatures which enacted the repealers intended to 
remove Illinois Brick’s per se bar on indirect purchaser suits.34  While the statutes 
do not state what type of harm the plaintiff must prove in order to be “injured,” we 
do know that direct purchasers and indirect purchasers must make the same 
showing.  The statutes declare that neither class of purchasers is to be privileged.  
Instead, antitrust suits shall be evaluated the same “regardless of whether such 
injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant.”35 
The statutes, therefore, do not evince the intention of granting automatic 
standing to all indirect purchasers.  To the contrary, they aim to subject indirect 
purchasers to the same procedural hurdles that befall direct purchasers.  And—at 
the time that every single Illinois Brick repealer was passed—one of those hurdles 
was “antitrust standing.”36 
Moreover, the state legislatures that passed Illinois Brick repealers must have 
been aware that “[a]n antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm 
to flow through the Nation’s economy.”37  Eliminating the requirement of antitrust 
standing would grant a cause of action to every person who felt such a ripple.  If 
the legislatures intended such a radical shift in antitrust policy, one would expect a 
clearer statement on the issue.38 
It is far more likely that the phrase, “regardless of whether such injured 
person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant,” was meant simply to 
remove the per se bar on indirect purchaser suits, leaving it to the courts to 
continue to define reasonable limits on who is “injured” within the meaning of the 
statutes.  Indeed, the legislatures must have been aware of the courts’ long tradition 
of treating the antitrust laws as common law statutes.39  Moreover, seventeen of the 
twenty-four Illinois Brick repealers were passed after AGC laid out its 
                                                          
34 The language “or indirectly” was added to the antitrust laws of many states in reaction to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Illinois Brick, thus earning such amendments the nickname “Illinois Brick 
repealers.”  See Davis, supra note 4, at 391–93.  Thus, at a minimum, these amendments aimed to 
remove the per se bar against indirect purchaser suits.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
Illinois Brick repealers “expressly allow indirect purchasers to sue.”  California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 
U.S. 93, 98 n.3 (1989) (citing the antitrust statutes of thirteen states and noting that they employ such 
phrases as “regardless of whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant”); 
see also id. at 100 (noting the existence of “express state statutory provisions giving [indirect] 
purchasers a damages cause of action”). 
35  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a). 
36 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.  It is also worth noting that seventeen of the 
twenty-four states (counting D.C. as a state) enacted their Illinois Brick repealers after AGC.  See Davis, 
supra note 4, at 391–93.  Likewise, all six of the high state courts that refused to follow Illinois Brick in 
interpreting their state’s antitrust statutes did so after AGC was decided.  See Ralph Folsom, Indirect 
Purchasers: State Antitrust Remedies and Roadblocks, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 181, 187–88 (2005). 
37 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972). 
38 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (“Congress’ silence in this regard can be 
likened to the dog that did not bark.”) (citing A. DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK 
HOLMES 335 (1927); Harrison v. PPG Indus, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“In a case where the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so 
relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into 
consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night.”). 
39 See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–88 (1978); SAS of P.R., 
Inc. v. P.R. Tel. Co., 48 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Despite its statutory framework, antitrust law is 
largely the handiwork of federal judges and antitrust enforcers . . . .”). 
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comprehensive limitations on “antitrust standing,”40 and yet, nothing in any of 
those seventeen statutes appears aimed at repealing AGC. 
For the eight Illinois Brick repealers that contain clauses regarding 
duplicative liability, it is even clearer that they did not intend to grant automatic 
standing to indirect purchasers.  Such clauses empower courts to “take any steps 
necessary to avoid duplicative recovery.”41  Two states, Rhode Island and Oregon, 
go even further, directing that “[t]he court shall exclude from the amount of 
monetary relief awarded . . . any monetary relief which duplicates amounts which 
have been awarded for the same injury.”42  It is not hard to imagine an indirect 
purchaser suit where dismissal is “necessary” to avoid duplicative liability.  
Indeed, in cases like Visa, in which the defendants have already entered into large 
settlements with direct purchasers, any damages plaintiffs might receive would 
necessarily be duplicative. 
Finally, a number of state antitrust laws explicitly request that they be read 
consistently with federal interpretations.43  Other states have case law establishing 
the same principle.44  Accordingly, the state legislatures which enacted the 
repealers had every reason to believe that although Illinois Brick’s per se bar 
would be repealed, their courts would continue to apply AGC’s prudential limits on 
standing. 
B. Argument from History 
Even putting the text aside, a state legislature still would not have expected 
the repeal of Illinois Brick to result in the annihilation of antitrust standing barriers 
because (1) Illinois Brick’s most well-known critics insisted that their position 
would not relieve plaintiffs from the requirements of antitrust standing; and (2) 
Illinois Brick itself explicitly states that it dealt with an issue that was separate and 
distinct from “antitrust standing.” 
Justice Brennan authored a forceful dissent from the Court’s decision in 
Illinois Brick, yet even he did not advocate granting automatic standing to all 
indirect purchasers.  To the contrary, Brennan admitted that “there is a point 
beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.”45  Brennan noted that 
                                                          
40 See supra note 36. 
41 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-33 (2009); see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7(2) (West 
2010); MINN STAT. ANN. § 325D.57 (West 2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340(6) (McKinney 2009); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3(C) (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2465(b) (2009). 
42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12(a)(1) (2009); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.775(1)(b)(A) 
(2009). 
43 By my count, twelve of the states which have passed Illinois Brick repealers also have 
provisions that direct courts to follow federal interpretations of the antitrust laws.  Six do so in 
mandatory terms.  See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-3 (LexisNexis 2009); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
§ 10/11 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-202(a)(2) (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 598A.050 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-15 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-2 (2009).  
Five phrase their harmonization clause in permissive terms.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-44-1412 
(2010); D.C. CODE § 28-4515 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.784(2) (West 2010); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 646.715(2) (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-22 (2009).  Vermont’s harmonization 
provision is unclear on this point.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(b) (2009). 
44 E.g., Minn. Twins P’ship v. State ex rel. Hatch, 592 N.W.2d 847, 851 (Minn. 1999). 
45 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Brunswick 
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courts have “developed various tests of antitrust ‘standing,’” to limit the reach of 
the antitrust laws, and appeared to advocate such a case-by-case approach.46  
While Brennan did not endorse any particular standing test,47 he would join the 
majority opinion in AGC just six years later.48 
Brennan’s acceptance of a case-by-case standing analysis is also revealed in 
his discussion of the risk of duplicative liability.  Brennan acknowledged the 
“abstract merit” of the majority’s concern about duplicative liability, but felt that it 
did not “justify erecting a bar against all recoveries by indirect purchasers without 
regard to whether the particular case presents a significant danger of double 
recovery.”49  Justice Brennan also mentioned a proposal by Professor Areeda that 
claimed that indirect purchaser cases should be decided based on “the number of 
intervening hands the product has passed through and the extent of its change.”50  
Professor Areeda’s approach was apparently an example of the type of case-by-
case approach that Brennan had in mind. 
The Illinois Brick plaintiffs adopted a similarly moderate position.  They did 
not advocate automatic standing for all indirect purchasers, but instead adopted the 
view that standing should be upheld only in instances where middlemen resell 
unaltered products, or where contractors add a fixed percentage markup to the 
costs of their raw materials.51  It would have been inadvisable to take a more 
extreme position (e.g., that all indirect purchasers of a price-fixed products should 
have standing), because the lower federal courts had been “virtually unanimous in 
concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in 
damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust 
violation.”52 
It is also critical to remember that Illinois Brick was not a standing case.  
Rather, the court dealt only with whether Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp. implied a per se bar on suits by indirect purchasers.53  The 
district court had rejected the suit under a standing theory, but the Supreme Court 
explicitly stated that it did not address the standing issue except to note that it is 
                                                          
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 
251 (1972)). 
46 Id. 
47 Some courts have claimed that Brennan endorsed the “target area” test for determining antitrust 
standing.  E.g., Knowles v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., No. Civ.A. CV-03-707, 2004 WL 2475284, at *5 (Me. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2004).  This is incorrect.  Brennan’s dissent merely mentioned that the “target area” 
test is “more liberal, and more widely accepted.”  Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 760 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  Yet, Justice Brennan joined the majority in AGC, which declined to adopt the target area 
test.  See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
536 n.33 (1983). 
48 AGC, 459 U.S. 519. 
49 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 761(Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
50 Id. at 760 n.15 (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 75 
(2d ed. 1974)).  Note the similarity between Professor Areeda’s approach and the modified AGC test 
articulated in Section  II.C. 
51 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 743 (citing Brief for Respondents at 9–30, Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720 
(No. 76-404); Transcript of Oral Argument at 36–48, Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720 (No. 76-404)). 
52 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972). 
53 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
2010 ILLINOIS BRICK: ANTITRUST STANDING UNDER STATE LAW 263 
 
“analytically distinct” from the question at hand.54  Similarly, Justice Brennan’s 
dissent treated the case as only dealing with whether there should be a categorical 
bar against indirect purchaser suits.  Brennan merely argued that the majority’s 
concerns did not justify “an absolute bar to recovery.”55 
This point has not been lost on several of the courts to consider the issue.  
Most notably, Judge Easterbrook, writing for a Seventh Circuit panel which 
applied the AGC test to an Illinois Brick repealer, explained that, while the state 
“does not follow the Illinois Brick doctrine,” that doctrine is “only one of several 
obstacles to . . . recovery on an antitrust claim.”56  Because Illinois Brick did not 
alter the Court’s antitrust standing jurisprudence, Illinois Brick’s repeal should 
imply nothing about standing. 
C. Opposing Cases 
Three of the four most recent courts to consider the issue have held that the 
Illinois Brick repealers abrogated antitrust standing.  This section will discuss each 
case in turn, and argue that their reasoning is flawed and should not be followed in 
future cases.  This section will also criticize a recent trend of federal courts 
refusing to apply AGC to state antitrust claims unless that state’s highest court has 
specifically ruled that AGC applies. 
1. Lorix v. Crompton Corp. (Minn. 2007) 
Lorix v. Crompton Corp. involved a suit that followed the Rubber Tire fact 
pattern.57  The Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to apply AGC on the grounds 
that (1) AGC and Illinois Brick are derived from the same concerns that the state 
legislature rejected in passing its repealer;58 (2) the state legislature authorized 
duplicative liability in passing its repealer;59 (3) the repealer’s legislative history 
shows the legislature’s intent to grant automatic standing to indirect purchasers;60 
and (4) any concerns about complex and speculative damages theories can be 
worked out in discovery.61  None of these form a defensible basis for the court’s 
decision. 
First, AGC and Illinois Brick do not stem from the same rationale.  The Lorix 
court made no effort to square its remarkable claim that “AGC was informed by 
Illinois Brick and repeated . . . Illinois Brick’s reservations about indirect purchaser 
suits,”62 with the fact that Justice Brennan—who authored a forceful dissent in 
                                                          
54 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 728 n.7. 
55 Id. at 759 (Brennan J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
56 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 196 F.3d 
818, 828 (1999) (citing Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 728 n.7). 
57 736 N.W.2d 619 (Minn. 2007). 
58  Id. at 627. 
59  Id. at 628. 
60  Id. at 632. 
61  Id. 
62 Id. at 629. 
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Illinois Brick—joined the majority opinion in AGC without reservation.  Moreover, 
AGC only cited Illinois Brick for two points.  The first cited Brennan’s dissent for 
the proposition that “there is a point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be 
held liable.”63  The second simply noted that both cases share the “same concerns” 
regarding duplicative liability.  But these concerns were also shared by the Illinois 
Brick dissenters.64  
This leads us to Lorix’s second claim that duplicative liability is a risk 
“inherent” in indirect purchaser suits, which the legislature necessarily embraced 
by repealing Illinois Brick.65  But again, the issue between the majority and dissent 
in Illinois Brick was not whether duplicative liability should be avoided, but how.  
The majority believed that the concerns warranted a per se exclusion of indirect 
purchasers; the dissent supported a case-by-case approach.66  Quite to the contrary 
of accepting duplicative liability as “inherent” in indirect purchaser suits, Justice 
Brennan thought that duplicative recovery in indirect purchaser suits would be rare 
because “direct purchasers who act as middlemen have little incentive to sue [their] 
suppliers.”67  Where such a risk did present itself, Brennan relied on “existing 
procedural mechanisms” to “eliminate this danger.”68 
Following Brennan’s lead, the legislative overrides proposed in the wake of 
Illinois Brick sought to avoid multiple liability,69 and the Illinois Brick repealers of 
several states—including Minnesota—contain clauses explicitly authorizing courts 
to do what is necessary to avoid such liability.70  Indeed, even the Lorix court itself 
took the position that duplicative recovery in indirect purchaser suits is “the 
exception, not the rule.”71  It is hard to credit the argument that lifting the bar on 
indirect purchaser suits necessarily implies accepting duplicative liability when the 
proponents of indirect purchaser suits vehemently denied the same. 
Third, the Lorix court cites two statements from a Minnesota Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearing in order to show that Minnesota’s Illinois Brick 
repealer was intended to grant automatic standing to indirect purchasers.  But the 
statements support the opposite claim.  The state’s Assistant Attorney General 
testified that, “[a]ll we’re saying is that under Minnesota law we recognize that 
indirect purchasers should have his or her [sic] rights to determine damages as well 
as the direct purchaser.”72  But direct purchasers have never enjoyed automatic 
standing to sue.  Rather, at the time the statement was made, direct purchasers 
were subject to the AGC test. 
                                                          
63 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 
(1983) (citing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
64 See supra, Section II.B. 
65 Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 628 (Minn. 2007). 
66 See supra Section I.B. 
67 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
68 Id. at 761. 
69 See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 603 (“All legislative attempts to overrule the rule of 
Illinois Brick recognize that some mechanism must be included to prevent multiple liability.”). 
70 See supra notes 43–44. 
71 Lorix, 736 N.W.2d at 631 (citing similar statements by a number of Illinois Brick critics). 
72 Id. at 627 (citing Hearing on Sen. F. 1807 Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 73rd Leg., (Minn. 
1984) (statement of Stephen Kilgriff, Assistant Att’y Gen.)). 
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The Lorix court also noted that a proponent of the bill told the committee 
“[w]e don’t want to [create] causes of action where they wouldn’t have existed 
prior to the Illinois Brick case.”73  If this indicates anything, it is that the legislature 
did not intend to create standing for remote injuries which would not otherwise 
clear the Supreme Court’s then-existing standing hurdles.  But Lorix apparently 
understood this statement as freezing antitrust standing jurisprudence where it was 
in 1977, so as to bar the application of the AGC test.74 
The suggestion that the Minnesota legislature secretly instructed its courts to 
ignore all post-1977 case law regarding antitrust standing is particularly odd given 
that that case law was in great flux in 1977.  As Justice Brennan observed, 
“[C]ourts have . . . developed various tests of antitrust ‘standing.’”75  Brennan then 
mentioned several tests that courts have used.76  Six years later—and one year 
before Minnesota’s Illinois Brick repealer was passed—AGC synthesized the 
various standing cases into one multifactor test.77  So even if Minnesota did intend 
to return antitrust standing to its 1977 state, a court would still be justified in 
applying the AGC test because it best reflects the “various tests” of antitrust 
standing that courts employed at the time of Illinois Brick. 
Fourth, although Lorix conceded that the question of “whether the damages 
claims are speculative is relevant to standing under Minnesota antitrust law,”78 it 
refused to consider this question at the motion to dismiss stage.79  The court found 
such an argument premature: 
[I]t is possible that the discovery process will reveal the amount of overcharge from 
Crompton, the chain of distribution through which the overcharge [may have 
flowed] to Lorix, the degree to which the overcharge may have been absorbed by 
more direct purchasers, and the impact of other market factors on the price of tires 
manufactured with price-fixed chemicals.80  
This position is inconsistent with the teachings of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly,81 which was decided less than three months before Lorix.  In Twombly, 
the Court recognized the unusually high cost of discovery in antitrust cases,82 and 
                                                          
73 Id. at 634 (citing Hearing on Sen. F. 1807 Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 73rd Leg., (Minn. 
1984) (minutes)). 
74 Id. (noting that “[c]laims of overcharge due to price fixing of components several steps removed 
from the ultimate consumer proceeded past motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in federal 
courts prior to Illinois Brick.”) (citations omitted). 
75 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
76 Id. at 760 & n.18. 
77 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 
(1983). 
78 Lorix, 736 N.W.2d at 628. 
79 Id. at 633. 
80 Id. 
81 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
82 Id. at 558 (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(“[T]he costs of modern federal antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal courts 
counsel against sending the parties into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
plaintiffs can construct a claim from the events related in the complaint.”); William H. Wagener, Note, 
Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 
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found that these costs justified a higher standard of pleading.  “[I]t is one thing to 
be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery,” the 
Court explained, “but quite another to forget that . . . antirust discovery can be 
expensive.”83  The Court worried that—unless there is stronger screening at the 
motion to dismiss stage—”the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious 
defendants to settle even anemic cases.”84 
Lorix dismissed Twombly in a footnote, finding that its “plausibility” 
standard established the requisite showing for pleading a price-fixing conspiracy 
but had no application to pleading damages.85  Yet Lorix provided no specific 
citation for this claimed limitation, and nothing in Twombly supports it.  To the 
contrary, Twombly’s concerns of litigation costs and settlement blackmail apply 
equally to damages theories.86  On litigation costs, William Landes and Richard 
Posner have noted that proving injury to indirect purchasers “requires knowledge 
of the elasticities of supply and demand” and “it is exceedingly difficult to estimate 
both.”87  These estimations may create “many practical difficulties” that 
“increase . . . the costs, time, and uncertainty involved in antirust enforcement.”88  
Likewise, since indirect purchaser suits will ordinarily be filed as class actions,89 
they implicate the concerns of settlement blackmail associated therewith.90  If 
courts follow Lorix and refuse to consider whether a plaintiffs’ damages theory is 
overly speculative until after discovery, many cases will settle before such a 
determination is ever made.   
Long v. Abbott Laboratories illustrates this point.91  Long involved eleven 
separate indirect purchaser class actions filed in eleven states after a federal suit 
alleging the same acts was filed by direct purchasers.  Although the defendants 
tried and won the federal case, the state class actions were too large and costly to 
litigate, and class counsel was able to extract a $9 million settlement.  Because the 
                                                          
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898–99 (2003) (discussing the unusually high cost of discovery in antitrust 
cases); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 30, at 519 (2004) (describing extensive scope 
of discovery in antitrust cases); Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil 
Rules, to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 11, 1999), 
192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000) (reporting that discovery accounts for as much as ninety percent of 
litigation costs when discovery is actively employed)). 
83 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. 
84 Id. at 559. 
85 Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 631 n.3 (Minn. 2007). 
86 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59.  Moreover, much to the chagrin of the Plaintiff’s bar, the Court 
has shown no desire to limit Twombly to its facts.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) 
(applying Twombly’s heightened pleading standard to Bivens claims). 
87 Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 619. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 612. 
90 See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]lass certification 
creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not.  The risk 
of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even when the probability of an adverse 
judgment is low.  These settlements have been referred to as judicial blackmail.”); In re Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to certify a class action where plaintiffs had lost 
thirteen of fourteen trials on similar claims, explaining that the likelihood of a forced settlement is 
unacceptable given that the claim was probably not meritorious). 
91 No. 97-CV-8289, 1999 WL 33545517 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 30, 1999). 
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damages theory was too remote and complicated to divide the settlement among 
the class, a cy pres fund was created.92  This settlement of an apparently non-
meritorious claim (with the proceeds not even going to the allegedly aggrieved 
class members) might have been avoided had the court taken a thorough look at the 
damages theory before moving the case into discovery. 
Finally, more troubling than what the Lorix court said is what the court did 
not say.  The court made little effort to define when, if ever, a claimed antitrust 
injury would be too remote to achieve standing under Minnesota law.  The court 
relied heavily on its prior decision in State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris 
Inc.,93 in which it held that Blue Cross, a health services organization, had standing 
under Minnesota’s Illinois Brick repealer to sue a group of tobacco companies.94  
Blue Cross alleged that the tobacco companies conspired to suppress research on 
the deleterious effects of smoking and to manipulate nicotine levels in cigarettes, 
which caused smoking addiction throughout Minnesota.95  This, in turn, allegedly 
led to increased health care costs for Blue Cross.96   
Phillip Morris illustrates the extreme results that could follow from the 
rejection of the AGC test.  The damage to the HMOs—if there was damage at all—
is indistinguishable from the many “ripples of harm to flow through the Nation’s 
economy” as a result of the use of tobacco.97  While numerous courts rejected 
similar claims out of hand,98 the Minnesota Supreme Court found it “clear” that the 
“expansive grant of standing” contained in Minnesota’s Illinois Brick repealer 
“reaches the injuries suffered by Blue Cross.”99 
Lorix did concede that Visa provided a fact pattern that was “most likely too 
remote and speculative to afford standing” because its theory of damages 
essentially allowed “every person in the state to sue for an antitrust violation 
simply by virtue of his or her status as a consumer.”100  Yet the court did not 
provide the principle by which it would reject standing in Visa,101 distinguishing it 
only on the grounds that it involved a tying arrangement whereas Lorix alleged 
price-fixing “which, at least in theory, provides a sounder basis for calculation of 
damages . . . .”102  Without any meaningful concept of antitrust standing, even a 
                                                          
92 Id.  The details of Long are also recounted in Crouch v. Crompton Corp., No. 02 CVS 4375, 
2004 WL 2414027, at *16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2004). 
93 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996). 
94 See Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 630 (Minn. 2007). 
95 Id.  
96 Id. 
97 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n. 14 (1972).  
98 See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d. 
Cir. 1999); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, 196 F.3d 
818 (7th Cir. 1999); Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 185 F.3d 
957 (9th Cir. 1999). 
99 State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Minn. 1996). 
100  Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 632 (Minn. 2007). 
101 Id. at 631 (“We find it unnecessary today to define the outer limits of antirust standing in 
Minnesota, because whatever those limits may be, Lorix falls well within them.”).  
102 Id. at 632.  The court also noted that Lorix indicated at oral argument that her proposed class did 
not include purchasers of tires attached to used cars, and that any suggestion to the contrary in her 
complaint was a “drafting error.”  Id. at 633 n.4.  The court further mentioned that Lorix abandoned her 
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simply case like Visa left the Lorix court grasping at straws. 
2. D.R. Ward Construction v. Rohm and Hass Co. (E.D. Pa. 2006) 
A second court to rule that the AGC test does not apply to claims under state 
antitrust laws is the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in D.R. Ward Construction Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co.103  There, a 
class of consumers of products containing plastic additives sued the manufacturers 
and distributors of those additives, alleging price-fixing.104  The district court 
refused to apply the AGC test to claims under the antitrust laws of Arizona, 
Tennessee, and Vermont, predicting that those state’s supreme courts would do the 
same if the question was squarely presented.105   
The D.R. Ward court offered mostly the same flawed arguments that have 
already been discussed in the context of the Lorix case.  The court exhibited a 
casual, pre-Twombly attitude,106 finding that, “although facts external to the 
complaint, such as the percentage of plastic additives in the products plaintiffs 
purchased, carry the potential to impact the causation analysis, these facts are 
irrelevant to the resolution of defendant’s motion to dismiss.”107  The court then 
insisted that “the discovery process is necessary to develop an array of factual 
issues that bear upon the directness of the plaintiff’s injury.”108  
Likewise, the court ignored concerns of duplicative recovery raised by 
ongoing direct purchaser suits in federal court, finding such worries “inapposite 
when used to determine standing under state antitrust statutes that permit indirect 
purchaser claims.”109  The court went on to conclude that “many of the 
considerations which motivated the Supreme Court to adopt the AGC analysis,” 
such as “the prevention of duplicative recoveries,” were “rejected” by the Arizona 
Supreme Court.110  However, the Arizona decision in question supports the 
proposition that duplicative recovery was a legitimate concern, to be dealt with on 
a case-by-case basis.  That court explained:  
The risk of multiple liability for defendants—that is, being subject to a direct 
purchaser action and also an indirect purchaser state case—is a legitimate and 
important concern.  It is not, however, a problem that our trial courts are 
incompetent to handle.  Indeed, most of the Illinois Brick repealer statutes leave the 
                                                          
earlier position, espoused at the court of appeals, that any Minnesota citizen could sue Crompton 
because the price-fixing raised the price of tires, which raised the price of transportation, which raised 
the price of all goods transported by truck within the state.  Id.  The Court found these limitations 
“sensible” and was “confident the district court can craft other sensible limits on the proposed class.”  
Id. 
103 470 F. Supp. 2d 485 (2006). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 In the court’s defense, D.R. Ward was decided before Twombly. 
107 D.R. Ward, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 502. 
108 Id. at 503. 
109 Id. at 504. 
110 Id. at 498. 
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solution to the double-recovery problem to the courts.111 
Like Lorix, D.R. Ward erected an extremely low bar for bringing an antitrust 
claim.  It found that a party has antirust standing in Arizona, Tennessee, and 
Vermont when it “meets the minimum constitutional requirements.”112  Applying 
this standard, the plaintiffs had standing because they alleged “the amount of the 
overcharge that was passed-on” to them and therefore had “an interest in the 
outcome of the litigation.”113   
The court’s analysis stems from confusion in terminology.  The term 
“antirust standing” is largely a misnomer.  The Court has often explained that the 
concept is more analogous to proximate cause than to traditional Article III 
standing.114  Thus, assuming arguendo that Arizona, Tennessee, and Vermont 
would not apply the AGC test, one would expect each state to apply some other 
proximate cause test, rather than simply applying constitutional standing.   
Without any proximate cause test whatsoever, the breadth of the antitrust 
claims that could be brought is stunning.  Indeed, even Visa would go forward 
under D.R. Ward because the plaintiffs there also had “an interest in the outcome 
of the litigation.”115   
3. Moniz v. Bayer Corp. (D. Mass. 2007) 
A third court to refuse to apply the AGC test to a state antitrust claim is the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Moniz v. Bayer 
Corp.116  Like Lorix, Moniz was a Rubber Tire case.  In just one paragraph the 
court rejected the AGC test simply by noting that the case interpreted federal law 
and that Massachusetts has recognized that indirect purchasers have standing.117 
                                                          
111 Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington, PLC, 75 P.3d 99, 108 (Ariz. 2003) (citing state statutes).  The 
Tennessee Supreme Court took a similar position: 
The risk that an antitrust violator may be subject to both a direct purchaser suit 
and an indirect purchaser suit under the TTPA does exist. Our trial courts, 
however, are competent to handle such a problem. In fact, many Illinois Brick 
Co. repealer statutes leave the solution of the risk of multiple liability to the trial 
courts.  
Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 520 (Tenn. 2005)  
(citations omitted).  
112 Id. at 498-99, 501. 
113 Id. at 498.  Although this statement was made in the context of applying Arizona law, the court 
made similar statements when referring also to the law of Tennessee and Vermont.  See, e.g., id. at 503 
(finding that claims under the law of each state may go forward so long as “plaintiffs can show that the 
unlawful increase in the price of plastics additives affected the cost of the products they purchased”) 
(emphasis added). 
114 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Courts have 
therefore developed various tests of antitrust ‘standing,’ not unlike the concept of proximate cause in 
tort law, to define that point.”); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531-36 (1983) (analogizing the notion of “antitrust standing” to that of 
proximate cause). 
115 D.R. Ward, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 498. 
116 484 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D. Mass. 2007). 
117 Id. at 231.  The court also implied that there were only “three unpublished opinions” that 
applied AGC to state law claims.  Id.  This is, of course, incorrect.  See supra note 14. 
270 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II 
 
4. “Clear Statement” Rule in Recent Federal Cases 
  Recently, several federal courts have refused to apply AGC to state 
antitrust claims in the absence of a clear directive from that state’s supreme 
court.118  This ostensibly modest approach suffers from three faults.  First, these 
federal courts assume they avoid making state policy by declining to apply AGC 
until a state court does.  Yet, these courts do not abstain from hearing state antitrust 
cases until state courts decide the issue.119  Instead, the courts hear such cases and 
thus have to decide whether or not to let the indirect purchasers’ claims go 
forward.  That is to say that the courts must decide unsettled state law questions.  
Normally, a federal court’s duty in such circumstances is to “carefully predict how 
the state’s highest court would resolve” the issue,120 without a thumb on the scale 
one way or the other.  By adopting an anti-AGC default, these courts do not 
“carefully predict,” rather they make an uninformed decision in the guise of 
abstention.   
Second, these federal cases create considerable incentives to forum shop.  
Any plaintiff’s attorney bringing an indirect purchaser suit is going to jump 
through hoops to get into federal court given the choice between a federal court 
that says it will not apply AGC until the state court decides the issue, and a state 
court that has not yet decided the issue.  Third, these federal courts have not 
explained how they would deal with a Visa fact pattern.  Presumably, these courts 
would have to either let such absurd cases go forward, or develop some sort of 
antitrust standing jurisprudence of their own to screen them.  
D. Summary 
This Part has argued that both the text and history of the Illinois Brick 
repealers suggests that those statutes were not intended to eliminate the AGC test 
of antitrust standing.  Rather, the AGC test should be applied to Illinois Brick 
repealers to the extent that it is consistent with those statutes’ policy goals and 
background assumptions.  The development of such a modified AGC test is the 
subject of the next Part. 
                                                          
118 See In re Potash Antitrust Litig., No. 08 CV 6910, 2009 WL 3583107, at *28 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 
2009) (“Absent any ruling or indication by the state supreme court or state appellate courts, this Court is 
reluctant to apply the federal AGC test to Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Michigan antitrust claim.”);  In 
re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“This Court . . . is 
reticent to adopt an across-the-board rule that a state’s harmonization provision . . . is an appropriate 
means of predicting how a state’s highest court would rule regarding the applicability of AGC to state 
law antitrust claims.”); In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1123 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008) (“[I]t is inappropriate to broadly apply the AGC test to plaintiffs’ claims under the repealer 
states’ laws in the absence of a clear directive from those states’ legislatures or highest courts.”); In re 
Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“Absent 
clearer directive from the courts and legislatures of those states, this order declines to hold that AGC is 
the laws of those states at this time.”). 
119 Compare Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (abstaining from hearing a case because 
it involves complex questions of state law, policy, and administration).   
120 Runner v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 568 F.3d 383, 386 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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III. A MODIFIED AGC TEST 
This Part presents a version of the AGC test that is modified so as to 
accommodate the policy choices embodied in the Illinois Brick repealers.  Section 
A canvases the approaches that courts have taken on this issue.  Section B lays out 
the principles that should guide the construction of a modified AGC test, and 
Section C develops such a test.   
A. Existing Approaches  
Some courts have applied the AGC factors to claims under Illinois Brick 
repealers without modification, apparently not recognizing that doing so may 
create a de facto ban on all indirect purchaser suits.121  For instance, a Wisconsin 
court found that the “directness” factor counseled dismissal since “there is no 
question that the plaintiff alleges injuries that are indirect.”122   
But if the mere fact that a plaintiff is not a direct purchaser counsels 
dismissal, then it is hard to see how the AGC test can be rectified with Illinois 
Brick repealers which demand that a plaintiff’s ability to bring suit should be 
determined “regardless of whether [the plaintiff] dealt directly or indirectly with 
the defendant.”123  The “better plaintiff” prong would also seem to count against 
every indirect purchaser since the direct purchaser is presumably a better private 
attorney general.124  The unmodified approach, then, risks dismissing each of the 
four fact patterns, even the Antibiotic case.   
Other courts have simply been unclear on how the AGC test is to be 
reconciled with the policy objectives of the Illinois Brick repealers.  In Kanne v. 
Visa U.S.A. Inc.,125 for instance, the Nebraska Supreme court dismissed plaintiffs’ 
claim in a Visa case by applying an unmodified AGC test.  The court then rejected 
the argument that “the wholesale adoption of the AGC five-factor test” would 
render the court’s previous recognition of indirect purchaser suits 
“meaningless,”126 asserting, without explanation, that the AGC test “can 
accommodate the approval of ‘indirect purchaser’ actions.”127  
Similarly unsatisfying is the analysis of the United States District Court for 
                                                          
121 See, Southard v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 734 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 2007); Strang v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 
No. 03 CV 011323, 2005 WL 1403769 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 8, 2005); Stark v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., No. 03-
055030-CZ, 2004 WL 1879003 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 23, 2004); Peterson v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., No. Civ.A. 
03-8080, 2005 WL 1403761 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2005); Ho v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., No. 112316/00, 
2004 WL 1118534 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 21, 2004), aff’d, 793 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), motion 
for leave to appeal denied, 833 N.E.2d 708 (N.Y. 2005). 
122 Strang, 2005 WL 1403769, at *4.  By contrast, the Iowa Supreme Court may have left room for 
a future softening of the AGC test.  Applying the “directness” factor to a Visa claim, the court found 
that “[c]learly, the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs are not even indirect, as the plaintiffs are not in the 
chain of distribution. Their injuries are better described as derivative.”  Southard, 734 N.W.2d at 199 
(emphasis added).  Unlike the Wisconsin court, Iowa stopped short of implying that the mere fact that a 
plaintiff is not a direct purchaser will count against finding antitrust standing.    
123 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 2010). 
124 See infra Subsection II.C.3; Landes & Posner, supra note 2. 
125 723 N.W.2d 293 (Neb. 2006). 
126 Id. at 300. 
127 Id. 
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the District of Delaware.  The court simply pronounced that “the remaining three 
factors,” referring to (1) whether the injury is direct or speculative; (2) whether 
there are more direct victims; and (3) the potential for duplicative recovery or 
complex apportionment of damages, “carry less weight in the standing analysis in 
jurisdictions rejecting Illinois Brick.”128  The court gave no indication as to how 
much weight these factors should carry. 
By contrast, at least three courts have set out to craft a version of the AGC 
test that takes “into account the broader principles relating to indirect purchasers 
provided by state law.”129  These courts divided, however, on whether and how 
each prong should be modified. 
First, In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation130 
dealt with the Computer Chip fact pattern.  The court found that the following 
factors applied in their unmodified form, and weighed against standing: (1) 
whether the plaintiff is a participant in the allegedly restrained market; (2) whether 
the alleged harm is “speculative”; and (3) the complexity involved in apportioning 
damages.131   
The court then modified the “directness” prong, so as not to prejudice 
plaintiffs simply because they are indirect purchasers.132  Instead, it asked 
“whether, as indirect purchasers, there is a direct link in the causation chain 
between defendants’ alleged conspiracy to restrain prices, and the artificially high 
prices paid by plaintiffs who purchased products in which DRAM is a 
component.”133  The court found this factor weighed against standing because 
DRAM is merely a component in an end-product “contain[ing] numerous other 
components, all of which collectively determine the final price actually paid by 
plaintiffs for the final product,” and because plaintiffs made no allegations that 
“demonstrate that . . . the ultimate cost of the DRAM component is somehow 
directly traceable” to the price plaintiffs paid.134  Finally, the court found that the 
duplicative recovery factor did not apply at all because states that passed Illinois 
Brick repealers “have necessarily made the policy decision that duplicative 
recovery may permissibly occur.”135 The court denied standing. 
Second, Crouch v. Crompton Corp.136 considered two cases, a Rubber Tire 
and a Visa case.  The court found that the following factors applied in their 
unmodified form, and weighed against standing in both cases: (1) whether the 
plaintiffs are participants in the allegedly restrained markets; and (2) whether the 
alleged harm is “speculative.”137  Notably, the court applied the “speculative harm” 
                                                          
128 In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410 (D. Del. 2007).   
129 In re. Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1088 
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
130 516 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (N.D. Cal 2007).   
131 Id. at 1089-93. 
132 Id. at 1091. 
133 Id. (emphasis added). 
134 Id. at 1092. 
135 Id.  
136 Nos. 02 CV 4375, 03 CV 2514, 2004 WL 2414027 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct 28, 2004). 
137 Id. at *18-27. 
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prong somewhat aggressively, apparently wanting plaintiffs to provide, at the 
complaint stage, regression analysis and estimations of supply and demand 
elasticities.138  The court found such analysis necessary to show that it is plausible 
that the plaintiffs suffered actual harm.   
As for “directness,” the court explained that, although being an indirect 
purchaser does not itself preclude standing, “the causal connection between the act 
and the claimed injury cannot be too remote.”139  The court further noted that 
“[p]urchasers who buy the product which is the subject of the restraint are more 
likely to be able to show sufficiently direct injury than those who purchase a 
product with a component which is the subject of the restraint.”140  The fewer and 
simpler the links of the distribution chain are, the more “direct” the injury claim is.  
Similarly, in considering whether there are better parties to bring the claim, the 
court omits direct purchasers from its calculations, looking only at whether there 
are better indirect purchasers that could sue.141 
The court also softened its consideration of the risk of duplicative recovery 
and danger of complex apportionment of damages, finding that these factors 
should be “limited by the General Assembly’s creation of indirect purchaser 
standing,” but not “totally eliminated.”142  The court denied standing to both the 
Rubber Tire and Visa plaintiffs. 
Third, in Knowles v. Visa U.S.A. Inc.,143 a Visa case, the court found that the 
following factors applied in their unmodified form, whether: (1) there are persons 
better situated to bring suit; (2) plaintiff’s damages are speculative; (3) there is a 
danger of duplicative recoveries; and (4) there is a need for complex 
apportionment.144  The court refused to penalize plaintiffs for not participating in 
the allegedly restrained market, finding that Maine’s Illinois Brick repealer 
suggests this factor should be irrelevant.145  The court also refused to apply the 
“directness” prong.146  Still, the court denied standing. 
B. Principles to Guide the Inquiry 
The courts which have sought to reconcile AGC with the Illinois Brick 
repealers have offered little guidance.  They are unhelpful, not simply because they 
disagreed amongst themselves, but also because they did not offer a clear picture 
of what they were looking for.  This article has examined the text of the repealers, 
informed by the public discourse regarding Illinois Brick, in order to ascertain the 
intent of the legislatures that sought to repeal that case.  This analysis yields four 
principles to guide the construction of a modified AGC test.   
                                                          
138 See id. at *19. 
139 Id.  
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 27. 
142 Crouch, 2004 WL 2414027, at *19. 
143 No. Civ.A. CV-03-707, 2004 WL 2475284 (Me. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2004). 
144 Id. at *6. 
145 Id. at *5. 
146 Id. 
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First, the text of the repealers suggests that they sought to remove the 
categorical bar on indirect purchaser suits and establish a regime where a 
plaintiff’s status as a direct or indirect purchaser alone did not affect his or her 
ability to sue.147  Accordingly, we must modify or eliminate any AGC factor that 
counts against standing based on a characteristic that is inherent in indirect 
purchaser suits. 
Second, Illinois Brick’s most prominent critics dealt with some of the 
specific issues that arise in applying AGC to the repealers.  With some issues, like 
duplicative recovery,148 Illinois Brick’s critics denied that their position would lead 
to such problems, and supported a case-by-case inquiry to deal with them if they 
arose.  With other issues, like the complexity of damage apportionment,149 the 
critics admitted that their position would result in such ills but deemed them 
necessary evils.  The positions of Illinois Brick’s critics on the precise issues in 
question are highly probative of the intent of Illinois Brick’s repealers. 
Third, the facts of Illinois Brick are instructive because the legislatures that 
sought to repeal that case likely expected that a case with identical facts could be 
brought under the new law.  In order to be faithful to the repealers, the modified 
AGC test must allow suits on facts similar to Illinois Brick.  It is therefore 
necessary to review those facts.   
The plaintiffs in Illinois Brick consisted of the state of Illinois and over 700 
Illinois cities and towns.  They alleged that that the defendants, manufacturers of 
concrete block, fixed the price of the blocks which were eventually sold to the 
plaintiffs by general building contractors in the form of concrete buildings.150  The 
general contractors followed a standard procedure to calculate bids made to public 
agencies.  As the plaintiffs’ brief explained:  
Prior to competitive bidding, the contractor ascertains the cost of concrete block 
required, as well as all other necessary materials, and gets quotations on jobs to be 
subcontracted, which may include masonry work.  Based on the lowest quotation 
he receives, the contractor includes the full cost of the concrete block, or masonry 
subcontract, in his bid as a known cost.  The contractor totals his material, labor, 
and subcontract costs, then adds a variable percentage for overhead and profit.151   
The modification of the AGC test will be a failure if it results in the dismissal of 
cases with facts indistinguishable from Illinois Brick. 
Fourth, the general line which the Illinois Brick plaintiffs drew between 
antitrust suits that should and should not be allowed is highly relevant.  As the 
Court summarized it, “[r]espondents here argue, not without support from some 
lower courts, that pass-on theories should be permitted for middlemen that resell 
goods without altering them and for contractors that add a fixed percentage markup 
to the cost of their materials in submitting bids.”152  The Illinois Brick plaintiffs 
                                                          
147 See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 48-50. 
149 See infra text accompanying notes 173-75. 
150 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977). 
151 Brief of Respondents at 20, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (No. 76-404). 
152 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726 (citing Brief for Respondents, supra note 53, at 9-30; Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 36-48, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (No 76-404)). 
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conceded that “the Supreme Court properly refused to let United Shoe muddy the 
record with esoteric inquiry into Hanover’s profit margins and hypothetical pricing 
changes.”153  But they distinguished Hanover Shoe, pointing out that the cost of 
concrete block is known in advance of bidding and included in the bid, and arguing 
that because the contractors do not purchase block until the bid is awarded, “any 
increase in this cost has a direct impact” on the plaintiffs.154   
Plaintiffs’ position was not an arbitrary line in the sand.  Rather, it was based 
on the then-current state of the case law.155  Indeed, plaintiffs cited several federal 
circuit cases drawing similar distinctions.156  The general line drawn by plaintiffs 
thus provides insight into the legal regime that existed pre-Illinois Brick and which 
may have been expected to return when that decision was repealed at the state 
level.   
C. The Modified AGC Test 
This section develops a modified AGC test with the above principles in 
mind. 
1. Participants in the Allegedly Restrained Market 
This factor should apply without modification.  DRAM, Crouch, and 
Knowles split on this question two-to-one.  Yet the cases do not offer any argument 
to support their conclusions.  This factor would support standing in fact patterns 
like the Antibiotic case where a retailer buys a product from a price-fixing 
manufacturer and sells it unchanged to the consumer.  In that situation, the retailer 
and the consumer are participants in the “same market” since they both purchase 
the same product, albeit the consumer is one step down the distribution chain.   
By contrast, this factor would not support standing in cases like the 
Computer Chip case and the Rubber Tire case, where the price-fixing manufacturer 
sells a product to another manufacturer who uses that product to create a new 
product, and ultimately sells that new product to a consumer.  There, the price-
fixing manufacturer and the plaintiff are not in the “same market.”  The former is 
in the market for the component product, the latter in the market for the end 
product.  As the DRAM court put it, “the market that plaintiffs allege as the source 
for the purportedly illegal price-fixing conspiracy was the general market for 
DRAM, a market that is distinct from the market for electronic products that 
include DRAM.”157   
The distinction between indirect purchasers of price-fixed products and 
indirect purchasers of products that contain or were made with price-fixed products 
                                                          
153 Brief for Respondents, supra note 53, at 22 (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. 
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968)). 
154 Brief for Respondents, supra note 53, at 21-23. 
155 Note the Court’s concession that plaintiffs’ position was “not without support from some lower 
courts.”  See supra text accompanying note 152. 
156 Brief for Respondents, supra note 53, at 10-19 (citing cases). 
157  In re. Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 2d, 1072, 
1091 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
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is not a mere formality.  Rather, it reflects a difference in the likelihood that the 
consumer suffered injury.  In the former case, the middleman’s costs consist 
largely of one thing: the price-fixed product.  By contrast, in the latter case, the 
manufacturer’s costs include all the component materials (of which the price-fixed 
product is but one), as well as labor, machinery, and everything else that goes into 
manufacturing.  The Illinois Brick plaintiffs made this same point in their brief, 
summarizing a then-current Second Circuit case.158 
Moreover, where the plaintiff buys the same product that was price-fixed, 
that product will likely have an inelastic demand curve, increasing the chances that 
the cost was passed on to the consumer.  This is so because it makes little sense to 
fix prices in an elastic market as consumers would simply refuse to pay the inflated 
rates.  However, when plaintiffs buy something that contains a price-fixed product, 
it may well be that the elasticities of demand for the two products differ 
substantially.  For example, the market for plastic may be rather inelastic, while the 
market for plastic toys may be rather elastic.   
This is not to say that a purchaser of products containing price-fixed 
materials can never recover.  The facts of Illinois Brick itself present an example 
where the value of a price-fixed component can be isolated and its pass-on proved.  
As just one of five considerations, this factor should operate more as a rebuttable 
presumption.  
2. The Directness of Plaintiff’s Alleged Harm 
This factor should apply in an appropriately modified form.  The mere fact 
that plaintiffs are not direct purchasers should not count against standing.  But the 
causal connection between the act and the claimed injury should not be too remote.  
Unlike the first prong, the inquiry here is not binary, but instead, presents a sliding 
scale.  The “more direct” theories of harm will involve a single product in a single 
chain of distribution, with few links in between plaintiff and defendant.  The “less 
direct” theories will concern products with tangential relationships to the price-
fixed product or involve many links and many chains of distribution, with multiple 
potentially intervening causes.  Of course, many cases will fall in between.   
3. Whether There is a Better Potential Plaintiff 
This factor should not apply at all.  Crouch tried to fit this factor with the 
repealers by asking only whether there is a better “indirect” plaintiff to bring the 
suit.159  But this misses the point made by the critics of Illinois Brick.  They were 
concerned with compensating victims—at least to the extent possible without 
incurring duplicative recovery—not simply with finding an efficient enforcer.160  
Moreover, they were skeptical of courts that would deny standing to a plaintiff that 
has brought suit by pointing to other parties that are in theory “better” but have not 
                                                          
158 Brief for Respondents, supra note 53, at 15 (citing West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 
F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
159 Crouch v. Crompton Corp, Nos. 02 CV 4375, 03 CV 2514, 2004 WL 2414027, at *27 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Oct 28, 2004) (emphasis added). 
160 Ill. Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 749, 764 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).   
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in fact sued.161  Accordingly, if a party meets the other AGC factors, standing 
should be upheld regardless of whether there exists a hypothetically better plaintiff. 
4. Whether Plaintiff’s Damages Theory is “Speculative” 
There is little dispute that this factor applies.162  In the context of indirect 
purchaser claims, this means that the onus is on the plaintiff, at the complaint 
stage, to show the plausibility of his or her damages theory.163  As Crouch pointed 
out, this will often require plaintiffs to show how they are going to estimate the 
elasticity of supply and demand, and how they will eliminate intervening causes.164  
Requiring the plaintiff to provide the details of his damages theory at the motion to 
dismiss stage not only screens out frivolous claims, it also protects valid ones.  
This factor allows a plaintiff who fails the first two prongs a chance to show that, 
although he or she is not a participant in the restrained market and his damages 
theory is remote, he or she actually has a reliable means of proving the harm he 
suffered.  
5. Complexity of Damages Apportionment and Risk of Duplicative 
Liability 
For whatever reason, these two distinct considerations get lumped into one 
factor.  Perhaps as a consequence, courts have either held that both apply in an 
unmodified form, or neither do.165  But a more nuanced view is required.  The 
complexity prong needs to be significantly softened while the risk of duplicative 
liability should apply with nearly full force.   
Justice Brennan rejected the argument that Illinois Brick plaintiffs’ claim 
should be dismissed because it would require “long and complicated proceedings 
involving massive evidence and complicated theories.”166  Noting that “this may 
be said of almost all antitrust cases,”167 Brennan appeared willing to bear this 
complexity.  State courts refusing to follow Illinois Brick have expressed similar 
sentiments.168  The Illinois Brick repealers may therefore be read as reflecting the 
policy decision that complex damage apportionment, and the accompanying 
                                                          
161 Id. at 749 (“Injured consumers are precluded from recovering damages from manufacturers, and 
direct purchasers who act as middlemen have little incentive to sue suppliers so long as they may pass 
on the bulk of the illegal overcharges to the ultimate consumers.”).   
162 Even Lorix conceded this point.  See Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 628 (Minn. 
2007) (“AGC factor (4), whether the damages claims are speculative, is relevant to standing under the 
Minnesota antitrust law.”). 
163 See supra text accompanying notes 84-95. 
164 Crouch, 2004 WL 2414027 at *19. 
165 Compare In re. Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 2d 
1072 (N.D. Cal. 2007), and Crouch, 2004 WL 2414027, with Knowles v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., Civ.A.CV-
03-707, 2004 WL 2475284 (Me. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2004). 
166 Ill. Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 758 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
167 Id. 
168 E.g, Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington, PLC, 75 P.3d 99, 108 (Ariz. 2003) (“The complexity of 
proving damages through multiple levels of sales is a daunting task, but one to which our courts are 
equal.”). 
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administrative costs, are prices worth paying in order to compensate actual victims.  
Therefore, a plaintiff with a reliable damages theory should not be turned away 
merely because of the administrative costs of dividing those damages among the 
victims.  Still, the repealer’s endurance of complexity must be limited by the 
rationale for doing so: compensation.169  Where a damages theory is so complex 
that the compensation to the real victims is de minimis or wholly absent,170 the 
policy behind the repealers no longer counsels in favor of standing. 
In contrast with complex damage apportionment, there has never been an 
indication that Illinois Brick repealers embraced duplicative liability.  Instead, 
those provisions—some explicitly, others implicitly—allow courts to take 
“necessary” steps to avoid double recovery.171  Where other suits arising from the 
same illegal acts have already provided full recovery, it is “necessary” for a court 
to dismiss the claim in order to avoid duplicative liability.  If another suit has 
already been filed, and plaintiffs cannot join that suit, the court should stay the 
action.  The only exception to this rule may be where a state indirect purchaser suit 
is followed by a federal direct purchaser suit.  Here, the state court would have no 
power to stop the federal claim from going forward and dismissing the state 
indirect claim would fly in the face of the chief goal of the Illinois Brick repealers: 
providing indirect purchasers a chance to recover which is equal to that of direct 
purchasers.172  
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article has sought to clean up a legal issue that has been clouded with 
confusion.  It has argued that the Illinois Brick repealers should not be read as 
granting automatic standing to indirect purchasers.  Instead, the repealers are 
largely consistent with the federal test of “antitrust standing” which the Supreme 
Court articulated in AGC.  Still, that test must be slightly modified so that it does 
not operate as a de facto reinstatement of Illinois Brick. 
Before concluding, it may be helpful to apply Part III’s modified AGC test to 
the four scenarios presented at the beginning of this article: 
The Antibiotic Case: The modified test would find standing in this case.  
The plaintiff-consumers and the manufacturer-defendants are both participants in 
the market for antibiotics.  It is therefore likely that the demand for the products 
that plaintiffs purchased is rather inelastic (otherwise why would defendants fix the 
prices of that product?).173  Further, the causal link between plaintiff and 
defendants is relatively simple, with a single product changing hands only two or 
three times.174  Plaintiffs will likely be able to offer a relatively reliable method of 
                                                          
169 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text. 
170 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra notes 42-43 and text accompanying notes 49-50. 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
173 This important fact—that plaintiffs and defendants are participants in the same market—would 
not be credited by the Knowles court.  See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  By ignoring this 
factor, the Knowles approach risks dismissing suits in which it is probable that defendant’s mark-ups 
were actually passed on to plaintiffs. 
174 But whether it changed hands two or three times is inconsequential under this article’s test.  By 
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proving damages, and there has not yet been a suit filed by direct purchasers. 
The Computer Chip Case: The modified test might support standing in this 
case.  Prong one counts against standing because plaintiffs are in the computer 
market, not the computer chip market.  The “directness” prong is unclear.  It will 
depend on the cost of the computer chip in relation to the total cost of 
manufacturing a computer.  It will make a big difference in terms of “directness,” 
whether the chip represents seventy percent of the cost of building the computer, or 
seven percent of that cost.  In an unclear case like this, a lot will depend on 
whether the plaintiffs demonstrate a reliable means of proving damages.  How are 
they going to show the inelasticity of the computer market?  How are they going to 
eliminate potential intervening causes?175  Of course, the fact that there has not 
been a direct purchaser suit counts in favor of standing. 
The Rubber Tire Case: The modified test would not support standing here.  
As a threshold matter, defendants have already been fined over 116 million dollars.  
Even if this criminal sanction does not count as “recovery,” there has also been a 
prior direct purchaser suit filed.  This at least counsels a stay of the suit pending 
resolution of the prior claim.  In any event, plaintiffs and defendants are in 
different markets (i.e., the tire market versus the rubber-processing chemical 
market).  The causal connection is far from “direct” since rubber-processing 
chemicals make up only a small portion of the cost of manufacturing tires.  It is 
also doubtful that plaintiffs will be able to present a reliable means of tracing the 
effect of this small increase in manufacturing costs. 
The Visa Case: This is the type of suit that the notion of “antitrust standing” 
was designed to bar.  The defendants have already paid over three billion dollars to 
direct purchasers, which alone warrants dismissal.  Plaintiffs are not even 
purchasers of components in a related market.  Instead, they are purchasers of the 
entire range of consumer products sold by nearly every merchant in the state (at 
least those who accept Visa or MasterCard).  Showing the pass-on would require 
an estimation of the elasticity of demand for almost every product sold in the state.  
Even if that feat were possible, it is hard to imagine how the funds could be 
apportioned.  
The modified AGC test thus helps shape the antitrust standing analysis in a 
way that does not prejudice indirect purchasers as such.  Indeed, the test would 
grant standing to indirect purchasers like those in the Antibiotic case who offer a 
plausible theory of damages and do not pose a risk of duplicative recovery.  The 
remote and speculative claims of the Rubber Tire and Visa cases are rightly 
rejected.  Borderline cases like the Computer Chip case will turn on the facts.   
As the AGC court noted, the “infinite variety of claims that may arise make it 
virtually impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in 
                                                          
contrast, the Crouch test would apparently hold that a plaintiff that is three levels down the distribution 
chain is a “worse plaintiff” than one that is two levels down and count that factor against finding the 
former plaintiff has standing.  See Subsection II.C.3.     
175 Because it rejects the complexity prong, this article’s test would uphold standing where 
damages can be reliably proven, even if doing so would be complex and costly.  The DRAM court, by 
contrast, dismissed a Computer Chip case, in part because of the complexity of proving damages.  See 
In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1088-89 
(N.D. Cal. 2008)   
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every case.”176  This article, however, has aimed to at least “identify factors” that 
“guide the exercise of judgment in deciding whether the law affords a remedy in 
specific circumstances.”177 
 
                                                          
176  Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
536 (1983). 
177 Id. at 537. 
